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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2704 
___________ 
 
ANDREW FIELDS, 
                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; PAEDRO, Educational Supervisor; DRESSLER, 
Unit Manager; CHAPPELL, Correctional Officer; HESS, Correctional Officer; 
STROUD, Correctional Officer; DITZ, Counselor; BARTH, Nurse; JENNIFER 
ENIGKT, S.M.U. Psychologist; GILIGAN, Correctional Officer;  POTTER, Nurse; 
BENEDICT, Correctional Officer; FARMINGER, Nurse; SCOTT, Lieutenant; 
CAPTAIN J  RHODES; WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; TROUTEMAN, Lieutenant; 
WILSON, Lieutenant; LEONOWICK, Lieutenant; ROBINSON, Nurse 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-18-cv-00306) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2019 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 18, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Andrew Fields appeals the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of his case for 
failure to prosecute.  For the following reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s 
judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
On February 5, 2018, Fields filed a civil rights action against numerous prison 
officials and guards, asserting various claims of harassment by the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons while incarcerated.1  On April 17, 2018, one month after most of the named 
defendants were served, Fields filed a motion to file a “supplemental complaint,” which 
included additional defendants and claims.  Dkt. #20.   
On April 18, the District Court issued an order, construing Fields’s motion as a 
motion to amend his complaint and granting him until May 9, 2018, to file one complete 
and all-inclusive complaint.  Within the District Court’s order were, among other things, 
directions on how Fields was to file a complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8 and a directive for the Clerk of Court to supply Fields with two copies of the 
court’s form order for filing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Dkt. #23. 
On April 30, prior to the deadline for filing the amended complaint set by the 
District Court, Fields filed a motion to stay proceedings and for an extension of time.  
Dkt. #24.  In his motion, Fields claimed that he was facing harassment as a form of 
retaliation for filing his complaint, including being placed in restraints, sprayed with 
pepper spray, and being denied access to his legal papers and other materials (including 
                                              
1 He also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction on 
February 26, 2018. 
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stamps).  On May 9, the District Court granted Fields an extension, but did not address 
his allegations of harassment/retaliation.  Dkt. #25.  The court set the deadline to file the 
amended complaint for May 28, 2018. 
On June 1, Fields filed a “motion for reconsideration” that also included new 
claims of harassment.  Dkt. #26.  In this filing, Fields noted that the court forms given to 
him by the District Court’s April 18 order were confiscated from his cell by prison guards 
(some of whom were named defendants), along with his prescription eye glasses.  On 
June 7, the District Court granted Fields until June 28 to file the amended complaint and 
ordered that no further extensions would be granted.  In its one-page order, the District 
Court did not substantively address or acknowledge Fields’s claims of difficulty in 
litigating, and construed the filing as “merely seek[ing] additional time to file [his] 
amended complaint.”  Dkt. #27. 
On June 18, Fields filed a “Motion Seeking Order to be re-issued Confiscated 
Legal Documents.”  Dkt. #28.  In this filing, Fields re-iterated that the court-issued 
documents provided by the District Court’s April 18 order and his reading glasses were 
confiscated, and asked the court to re-issue those documents to him so that he could 
comply with the District Court’s June 7 order.  See Dkt. #28. 
On July 20, 2018, the District Court sua sponte dismissed Fields’s complaint for 
failure to prosecute and comply with court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b).  The District Court did not address Fields’s claims of harassment and 
considered his failure to file an amended complaint as evidence of his history of 
dilatoriness.  Before dismissing the complaint, the District Court never addressed Fields’s 
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motion for a temporary restraining order or injunctive relief.  Fields timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the District Court’s sua sponte decision to dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 41(b) for an 
abuse of discretion.  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008).  “While we 
defer to the District Court’s discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in 
limited circumstances and doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on 
the merits.”  Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Under Rule 41(b), a district court may punitively dismiss an action if a litigant has 
failed to prosecute or to comply with a court order.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).  A court 
must justify its decision under the multi-factor balancing test stated in Poulis v. State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).  Under Poulis, a court must 
weigh: “(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a 
history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or 
in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an 
analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.”  Id. 
at 868 (emphasis removed).  Dismissals with prejudice are drastic sanctions; accordingly, 
a “[d]ismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, resort.”  Id. at 869.   
We have advised that a district court dismissing a case sua sponte “should use 
caution in doing so because it may not have acquired knowledge of the facts it needs to 
make an informed decision.”   Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258.  In such cases, a district court 
“should provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to explain his reasons for failing to 
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prosecute the case or comply with its orders prior to dismissing a case sua sponte.”  Id.  
While there is no “magical formula” or “mechanical calculation” in evaluating a Rule 
41(b) dismissal, “we have never upheld a court’s dismissal when it was supported by an 
inadequate foundation on even one of the Poulis factors.”  Hildebrand v. Allegheny 
County, 923 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2019). 
Here, it appears that the District Court based its decision to dismiss the case 
primarily, if not solely, on Fields’s noncompliance with the orders directing the filing of 
his amended complaint.  The District Court determined that Fields’s noncompliance was 
evidence of a history of dilatoriness, which in its view outweighed the other Poulis 
factors.  While the District Court explained that it analyzed all of the Poulis factors, its 
analysis of those factors was cursory and, based on our review of the record, rested on an 
insufficient factual foundation.2  See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258 (“To determine if the 
District Court abused its discretion in dismissing the case, ‘we will be guided by the 
manner in which the trial court balanced the [Poulis] factors, . . . and whether the record 
supports its findings[.]”). 
As to the extent of Fields’s personal responsibility, the District Court never 
addressed Fields’s claim of harassment, which was the alleged cause of his inability to 
file the amended complaint (as well as one of the foundations for his initial complaint).3  
                                              
2 The memorandum opinion gives one-sentence conclusions, without explanations, for 
the first five factors, and does not give any analysis on the sixth factor. 
3 In a footnote, the District Court briefly acknowledged Fields’s claim that the legal 
documents provided by the court’s April 18 order were confiscated.  Nevertheless, it 
summarily concluded that this was “nothing more than another dilatory tactic” which was 
considered by the court in its June 7 order.  Dkt. #29 at 2.  However, as noted above, the 
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Moreover, the District Court never sought any explanation from Fields or the Defendants 
regarding the alleged interference with Fields’s ability to litigate.  An Order to Show 
Cause asking for reasons why dismissal would be inappropriate would have allowed 
Fields an opportunity to be heard, forced the Defendants to respond to the allegations of 
their interference with his litigation, and provided the District Court with the facts it 
needed to make an informed decision.  See id.  Instead, the District Court made 
unsupported assumptions as to Fields’s actions, which permeated into the rest of its 
analysis and weighing of the Poulis factors. 
For example, the District Court’s finding of prejudice rested on the factual 
conclusion that Fields was purposefully delaying the filing of his amended complaint.  
But according to Fields, his inability to file an amended complaint stemmed, in part, from 
some of the named Defendants’ own actions, including confiscating the forms Fields was 
supposed to use to file his amended complaint.  Under Fields’s facts, the Defendants 
themselves caused any prejudice they may have suffered.  Again, the District Court did 
not provide an opportunity for Fields to be heard so as to make an informed decision on 
this factor.  See id.   
Similarly, the District Court’s conclusion that Fields was dilatory was predicated 
on its finding that Fields was purposefully delaying his filing of an amended complaint.  
                                              
District Court’s June 7 order was a single page, which did not substantively address or 
acknowledge Fields’s claims of difficulty in litigating, and construed Fields’s filing as 
“merely seek[ing] additional time to file [his] amended complaint.”  Dkt. #27.  While the 
District Court may very well have considered Fields’s claims, nothing in the record 
shows that the District Court actually did so. 
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However, as noted above, the District Court did not provide Fields an opportunity to 
explain his inability to file, and did not respond to Fields’s requests to re-issue the forms 
from its April 18 order so that he could submit an amended complaint.  Indeed, Fields 
consistently attempted to inform the District Court of the problems he was having in 
litigating the case, but these pleas were never substantively addressed and were instead 
deemed “nothing more than another dilatory tactic” by the District Court.  Dkt. #29 at 2.   
Moreover, even assuming some purposeful delay on Fields’s part, it is not clear 
that alone outweighed all of the other Poulis factors given the record before us.  This case 
was pending only a few months when Fields filed his motions for extension of time over 
the course of two to three months.  Cf. Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. 
Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 875 (3d Cir. 1994) (agreeing that the failure to prosecute for more 
than four years amounted to a history of dilatoriness).  As illustrated above in the 
procedural history, only one of these motions was filed out of time, and Fields was 
generally attentive/responsive to the District Court’s orders.  See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261 
(“[C]onduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a history of 
dilatoriness.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 
F.2d 871, 875 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that, although the plaintiff’s pretrial documents 
were “filed inexcusably late,” it was not the same history of dilatoriness present in 
Poulis); Donnelly v. Johns–Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(reinstating plaintiff’s case where the plaintiff acted dilatory on one occasion but no 
evidence existed that the plaintiff’s behavior was willful).   
Finally, the District Court’s analysis of the Poulis factors does not comport with 
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our “clear and repeated instruction” to resolve doubts in favor of reaching a decision on 
the merits.  See Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 138.  The District Court concluded in a single 
sentence that Fields’s “history of dilatoriness” also constituted a “willful disregard” of the 
court’s authority while providing no substantive analysis on this factor.  Similarly, the 
District Court dedicated a single sentence to its holding that alternative sanctions would 
be ineffective to deter Fields’s conduct while failing to mention any other possible 
alternative sanctions it considered.  See id. at 136 (“A district court must consider 
alternative sanctions before dismissing a case with prejudice.”).  “While district courts 
need not put on the record consideration of every possible sanction before dismissing a 
case with prejudice,” the District Court’s analysis here is insufficient to honor our 
longstanding policy of favoring decisions on the merits.  See id. 
Taking all of the above into consideration, we conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in dismissing Fields’s case.  Consequently, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
